Compatibilism
01-Aug-2013: Original version

Compatibilism is an attempt to reconcile determinism with free will. This is particularly important when considering the issue of morality in a deterministic universe.

Incompatibilists reject compatibilism.

The Issue

Determinism - whether absolute determinism or stochastic - conflicts with the concept of free will. If all our actions can be determined in advance, how can they said to be free? Since morality requires an ability to "do otherwise", this has serious implications for epiphenomenal theories of consciousness.

Compatibilism argues that there is no contradiction between determinism and free will and hence that moral responsibility still exists in a deterministic world.

What Is Freedom?

I maintain that there are two distinct elements required before it can be said that someone has alternatives to a course of action (in other words, has free will):

• Freedom to choose between alternatives
• Freedom to act on that choice

"Freedom to choose" is the ability to make a decision. If Andy has freedom to choose then he can choose whether to buy a cheese or a chicken sandwich for lunch. Determinism removes this freedom by saying that his apparent free choice is in fact predetermined, either absolutely or in statistical terms according to some random quantum action. The feeling of making a decision is simply an illusion.

"Freedom to act" is the ability to perform the chosen action without external limitation. It represents scope for action. If both cheese and chicken sandwiches are available and Andy has the necessary money than he can implement either choice. But if the Poultry Liberation Front has forced chicken sandwiches off the shelf then his freedom to act is limited; however much he might want a chicken sandwich he is unable to buy one.

Restrictions on either freedom to choose or freedom to act limit our potential action space. Compatibilism often argues that freedom to act compensates for deterministic restrictions on freedom to choose. Freedom of action without freedom of choice is considered adequate for free will.

Thomas Hobbes took this position in Leviathan:

"...from the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe."
(Hobbes, 1651)
Hobbes thus defines free will in terms of lack of external obstruction. This definition - with which I disagree - seems to be the basis of much compatibilitist argument.

Compatibilists sometimes point out that, when seen from outside, a system with freedom to act but no freedom to choose can be indistinguishable from one with both freedoms. Hence the frequent references to Conway's game of "life" and other cellular automata in which strict determinism results in a universe that appears unconstrained. This is irrelevant: cellular automata look impressive until we learn their rules, then we see that they are the equivalent of philosophical zombies. Having a wide range of possible predetermined outcomes does not stop those outcomes from being predetermined. The cells in a cellular automaton have no ability to "do otherwise".

Morality

If we have no free will then there are major moral implications. In particular we can have no responsibility for our actions.

Compatibilists argue that even under determinism we do have moral responsibility. Many of these arguments are based on the position that even under determinism we do have alternative actions available. Since I reject the premise that a person has alternatives in a deterministic world I do not accept the conclusion.

Another argument sometimes raised is that if we are forced to do something we would have chosen to do anyway then we are morally responsible for that action. I believe that even if we end up doing "what we want" but have no choice in "what we want" then we do not have free will and hence have no moral responsibility.

My Position

The appeal of compatibilism is understandable. It allows determinists to avoid the messy implications of a world without morality. Determinism without compatibilism means that nobody can be blamed or praised for their actions; a very unappealing prospect. If I were a determinist I might be drawn to compatibilism for this reason. But I'm not so I'm not.

I reject compatibilism. Freedom has simply been redefined in a way I do not accept. Lack of external impediment to a forced action is not the same as having free choice of action.

Freedom to act without freedom to choose gives only the illusion of having alternatives. Moral responsibility requires both freedoms. But determinism means that all choices are compelled choices and hence all actions are compelled actions. In a deterministic world a person never truly makes decisions and thus never has genuine alternatives. This is the consequence argument.

Just because predicting someone's actions is impractical does not make those actions free.
Just because it is pragmatic and reassuring to assume that people have moral responsibility does not make the assumption true.

References:
Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan, chapter 21.