Qualia
01-Aug-2013: Original version

Qualia are one of the most controversial aspects of consciousness studies. This is in part because they are extremely difficult to define or even to describe.

What Are Qualia?

There's no easy definition of qualia. Essentially they are the subjective experiences associated with consciousness: the "properties of conscious experience". Qualia are the "feeling" of pain, the "taste" of haggis, the "sensation" of embarrassment.

All these are definitely things we experience as conscious beings - but what are they? Are they simply the renaming of physical brain states? Are they epiphenomena? Or are they something else entirely?

From a subjective view it can be argued that qualia are central to what we intuitively think of as consciousness: without qualia, can we really said to be conscious in any meaningful way? Therefore the question of their existence - let alone their nature - is of vital importance.

Is "seeing red" anything more than the activation of certain sensory apparatus and associated neural patterns?

From an intuitive perspective it certainly feels like qualia exist and that they are something beyond mere patterns of brain activity. Yet their subjective nature makes them impossible to even properly explain let alone test. Qualia are on that cusp that the mysterians say we will never truly understand.

Some people have gone as far as to suggest that qualia do not even exist. Or that they do exist but are simply misguided interpretations of physical brain states. Or that they are actually external properties.

One of the high profile opponents of the idea that qualia are in some way "special" is Daniel Dennett. He famously concluded:

"So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all."
(Dennett 1988)

Mary's Room

One of the most famous thought experiments concerning qualia is Mary's room. This was first proposed by Frank Jackson in his paper "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (Jackson 1982).

Mary is a brilliant colour scientist who - for reasons that need not concern us - has spent her whole life in a black and white room with no access to anything in colour. However she has read everything there is to know about colour. She understands the physics of light, how the eyes and brain respond to colour and even the psychology and cultural implications of colour.

One day Mary is finally allowed to leave her room. She sees red for the first time. Will she now experience something new?

The intuitive view is "yes". But if she already knows everything physical there is to know about "red", what can this new experience be? Whatever it is, many have taken Mary's experience as an example of qualia. Others have denied that Mary experiences anything new at all.

My Position

I believe that qualia do exist for the simple reason that I experience them. None of the elimitavist alternatives explain my subjective observations in a way I find satisfying.

Belief in qualia does not require an immediate explanation for them. As of yet I have no such explanation.

I would welcome any theory of consciousness that analyses and/or explains qualia. However I will reject any theory that says qualia do not exist on the grounds that it is inconsistent with my observations.

References:
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988. Quining Qualia
Jackson, Frank. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia